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1. Introduction 
The 2015 Supreme Court case of DPP v JC1 has been described as ‘the most astounding 
judgment ever delivered by an Irish court.’2 Reflecting primarily on the passionate dissent of 
Hardiman J in the case, Fennelly says that ‘DPP v JC has everything: law, literature, history, 
polemic and vast learning but also emotion, horror, anger, even shame.’3  
In JC, a 4:3 majority of the Court removed and replaced the exclusionary rule in relation to 
improperly obtained evidence which had been in operation in this jurisdiction for 25 years. The 
old rule, set out in People (DPP) v Kenny,4 was viewed by the majority as operating in an 
overly strict manner, excluding evidence obtained in breach of constitutional rights even where 
such breach was inadvertent, in the sense that the person whose actions constituted the breach 
did not realise, or in some cases could not possibly have realised, that a breach would result. 
The new rule ensures that evidence obtained in inadvertent breach of constitutional (or other) 
rights may be admitted at trial. It further provides that where any apparent unconstitutionality 
arises as a result of subsequent legal developments (e.g. a judicial finding that a statutory garda 
power is unconstitutional), the evidence obtained may yet be admitted.  
While the new provision for the admission of evidence on the basis of inadvertent breach has 
been given most attention in the aftermath of JC, importantly, that case also introduces a 
rebuttable presumption against the admission of evidence obtained in reckless or grossly 
negligent breach of constitutional rights. Only evidence obtained in knowing breach of 
constitutional rights will be automatically excluded.5  
JC was decided by a slim majority and there were strong dissents on both substantial and 
procedural grounds. The late Hardiman J, as noted above, gave an impassioned dissent. He 
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termed the abrupt alteration of the existing rule in this case “a revolution in principle”,6 which 
was at odds with the ‘gradualist, minimalist and “interstitial” power of the Common Law 
judges to develop or evolve the law in light of changing circumstances.’7 He expressed the 
view that the Kenny case was one of the ‘monuments of the constitutional jurisprudence of 
independent Ireland’,8 and on the substance of the change being brought about by the majority 
he contended that matters of Garda accountability and discipline had not improved to the point 
where a strong exclusionary rule had become unnecessary;9 the Kenny rule was not “absolute” 
or “near absolute” in its terms;10 and, breaches of constitutional rights ought to result in 
exclusion of evidence so as to ensure restitutio in integrum for the rights-holder.11  
On the question of restitution, Bloom and Dewey, writing on the Irish exclusionary rule prior 
to JC contended that  
Every right requires a remedy that restores individuals to the position they would have 
occupied prior to the violation, not a remedy that merely deters future conduct or that 
balances a number of factors beyond the violation to maintain judicial integrity. Rather, 
the objective of the exclusionary rule must be to vindicate constitutional rights and to 
establish a consistent and strong remedy for the vindication of such rights.12 
The majority in JC were not of like mind; they sought to delineate differing circumstances 
which might occasion a breach, and to allow for differing judicial responses to same. 
A similar approach was adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in moving from the 
strictly-operated prima facie rule of exclusion of evidence obtained in breach of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) to the more flexible “proportionality-balancing” 
test. In a case which pre-dated the eventual alteration of that rule, Richardson P suggested that  
                                                          
6 JC (n 1) per Hardiman J para 134. 
7  JC (n 1) per Hardiman J para 132. 
8 JC (n 1)  per Hardiman J para 198. 
9 ‘Since this matter has been raised by the appellant I have to make it clear that I do not consider that any changes, 
legal or otherwise, have taken place over the last twenty-five years which would make it desirable, or even safe, 
to make the change which the present appeal is designed to bring about. On the contrary, there have, during that 
time, been a considerable number of deeply disturbing developments both in relation to the Garda Síochána itself 
and to the arrangements for its oversight. These have been expressly acknowledged in impressive and authoritative 
sources, as will be seen.’ JC (n 1) per Hardiman J para 160 
10 JC (n 1) per Hardiman J para 199, using the language of O’Donnell J at para 49 of his judgment. 
11 JC (n 1) per Hardiman J para 224. 
12 Robert M. Bloom and Erin Dewey, ‘When Rights become Empty Promises: Promoting an Exclusionary Rule 
that Vindicates Personal Rights’ (2011) 46(1) Irish Jurist 38-73, 73. 
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[a] robust and rights-centred approach to individual rights is not necessarily 
inconsistent with flexibility of remedies where rights are breached. A remedy is no less 
an effective remedy because it is one appropriate to the circumstances of the breach 
rather than a remedy inflexibly applied in respect of all breaches.13 
The New Zealand experience of moving from a strict to a more flexible exclusionary rule bears 
some resemblance to the situation in this jurisdiction and will be referenced throughout this 
article. But how different is the new Irish rule to its predecessor? How is it being applied by 
the courts? And has it had any significant impact to date? This article explores the new rule, its 
rationale and operation, and the main cases wherein it has been considered since its 
pronouncement three years ago, in April 2015.  
 
2.1 The New Exclusionary Rule 
As set out in brief terms above, the majority of the Supreme Court in JC held that the rule 
adopted a quarter of a century previously in Kenny, and in operation throughout the judicial 
system ever since, was erroneous and ought to be replaced by a new rule. The main difficulty 
identified with the Kenny rule was its application, and the resultant exclusion of evidence, even 
in cases where the breach was wholly inadvertent. It was claimed that the rule was operating 
in an overly strict manner to the detriment of the criminal process, and a new rule was 
accordingly pronounced.  
The ardent terms of Hardiman J’s dissent, in particular, suggested that this new test signified a 
significant shift away from the status quo and that its impact would likely be detrimental to the 
protection of individual rights within the criminal process. However, on examination of the 
new rule the reality may not be quite so extreme. Hogan, writing extra-judicially, has suggested 
that: 
the modified Kenny test proposed by the majority in JC did not abandon the 
exclusionary rule doctrine entirely, but simply sought to mitigate its more dramatic, 
unanticipated results by essentially proposing a negligence-based standard for assessing 
whether there had been a deliberate and conscious violation of constitutional rights.14 
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The new rule is set out in the judgment of Clarke J.15 It begins by declaring that the onus is on 
the prosecution to establish the admissibility of all evidence. Where there is a challenge to 
evidence on grounds of alleged unconstitutionality in the manner that it was obtained, the 
prosecution must establish, on the basis of facts proven beyond reasonable doubt, that either 
(a) it was not obtained in breach of constitutional rights, or (b) if it was obtained in breach of 
constitutional rights it is still appropriate for the court to admit the evidence. Essentially, it will 
only be appropriate to admit evidence obtained unconstitutionally if (i) this occurred due to 
inadvertence, in the sense that the person who breached the rights and/or relevant superior 
officials did not know that rights would be breached through the relevant actions, or (ii) if the 
unconstitutionality resulted from subsequent legal developments (as was the situation on the 
facts of JC itself).  
On the other hand, if it is accepted by the court that the violation of rights was deliberate and 
conscious, then the evidence ought to be excluded, unless there are extraordinary excusing 
circumstances in existence (as defined in the pre-JC jurisprudence). The meaning of deliberate 
and conscious is explicitly defined as referring to the knowledge of the person whose actions 
breach the right(s) and/or relevant superior official(s).  
Clarke J also declared that “inadvertence” does not include the concepts of recklessness and 
gross negligence.16 He referenced a presumption against the admission of relevant evidence 
where it is obtained in circumstances of unconstitutionality which was not conscious and 
deliberate (i.e. not within the knowledge of the individual garda or his superiors). It is clear, 
from the judgment, that the presumption is rebutted if the evidence was obtained inadvertently 
in breach of rights, or if the breach derives from subsequent legal developments. In relation to 
inadvertence, Ní Choileáin and Bazarchina observe that ‘[n]o guidance is given as to how the 
prosecution is to discharge the onus of establishing inadvertence, bearing in mind that the 
requirement to do so extends beyond the garda directly involved.’ 17 
There is an even greater lack of clarity in relation to circumstances involving recklessness and 
gross negligence. It would appear that the presumption against admissibility is still in play in 
such circumstances, but how can it be rebutted? No clarity is provided in JC as to the exact 
operation of this presumption and its potential rebuttal. Is this entirely a matter of judicial 
                                                          
15 JC (n 1) per Clarke J para 7.2. 
16 JC (n 1) per Clarke J para 5.14. 
17 Cecilia Ní Choileáin and Anna Bazarchina, ‘Admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence after DPP v 
JC’ (2015) 20(4) Bar Review 83-86, 86. 
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discretion? Are there guidelines for trial judges to follow in exercising said discretion, or 
factors which must explicitly be balanced against one another? It seems not; or at least not 
pronounced within JC itself. 
Clarke J noted that the precise application of the principles set out in JC would need to be 
developed on a case by case basis. The editorial in the Irish Criminal Law Journal following 
the case also observed that  
[t]he practical significance of the new direction taken by the Supreme Court will only 
become apparent when it is applied by trial judges to everyday arguments about the 
admissibility of evidence. For a while there is bound to be some uncertainty whilst the 
prosecution and the defence seek to test the boundaries of the new regime.18 
While some cases, discussed below, have touched on JC and its principles, no great sense of 
clarity has yet come through the case law. 
 
2.2 Rationale and Operation of the Rule 
The new test has undoubtedly moved away from the protectionist/vindication rationale that 
was overtly adopted by the Supreme Court in Kenny, it is not fully clear which rationale has 
replaced it. Clarke J discussed the “high constitutional value” to be attached both to ensuring 
that all potentially relevant evidence is considered at a criminal trial,19 and to ensuring that 
investigative and enforcement agencies (including An Garda Síochána) operate within the 
limits of their powers in gathering evidence.20 He concluded that there is a need to find a 
balance between these two competing matters. He acknowledged that in the past there may 
have been a tendency for trial courts to admit evidence obtained in breach of legal (not 
constitutional) rights, and that difficulties have, unfortunately, been found to exist in relation 
to the conduct of some elements of An Garda Síochána.21 Clarke J concluded that the best 
approach to this is not to maintain an “almost absolute” exclusionary rule, but to  
define the law in terms which represent an appropriate balance of the constitutional 
rights and values at issue, to require trial courts to exercise vigilance to ensure that 
investigating agencies (such as An Garda Síochána) act in an appropriate fashion and 
                                                          
18 Editorial, (2015) 25(2) Irish Criminal Law Journal 29. 
19 JC (n 1) per Clarke J at para 4.8. 
20 ibid per Clarke J at para 4.11. 
21 ibid per Clarke J at para 4.23. 
6 
 
to enable trial judges, having carried out such vigilant scrutiny, to apply a properly 
defined constitutional balance to the situation which then emerges.22  
He further noted the important role of the appellate courts in redressing any imbalance that 
might arise in the application of the law by trial courts, particularly in relation to any claim of 
“over-generous” admission of evidence.23  
Rather than any deterrent rationale, O’Donnell J seemed primarily concerned with the 
administration of justice:  
A criminal or civil trial is the administration of justice.  A central function of the 
administration of justice is fact finding, and truth finding.  Anything that detracts from 
the courts’ capacity to find out what occurred in fact, detracts from the truth finding 
function of the administration of the justice.  As many courts have recognised, where 
cogent and compelling evidence of guilt is found but not admitted on the basis of trivial 
technical breach, the administration of justice far from being served, may be brought 
into disrepute.  The question is at what point does the trial fall short of a trial in due 
course of law because of the manner in which evidence has been obtained? When does 
the admission of that evidence itself bring the administration of justice in to disrepute?24  
Ultimately, like Clarke J, O’Donnell J concluded that a test requiring a balancing of interests 
is required. In analysing the varying approaches adopted in other jurisdictions,25 he remarked 
that ‘[p]erhaps the most interesting analysis from an Irish perspective is that undertaken in New 
Zealand after the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.’26 O’Donnell J then 
looked at the New Zealand case law which brought about a change from the strictly-operated 
prima facie rule of exclusion27 to the more flexible proportionality-balancing test.28 He also 
observed that the latter test was placed on a statutory footing in that jurisdiction under s 30 of 
the Evidence Act 2006. He did not, however, note the fact that in the direct aftermath of the 
shift to the new rule in New Zealand, the courts struggled to apply the rule with any level of 
consistency and to carve out a clear jurisprudence thereunder. 
                                                          
22 ibid per Clarke J at para 4.25. 
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24 ibid per O’Donnell J at para 97. 
25 Including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. 
26 JC (n 1) per O’Donnell J at para 82. 
27 Established in R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257. 




2.3 The New Zealand proportionality-balancing test 
It is helpful to examine the New Zealand proportionality-balancing test in more detail at this 
juncture, as it provides quite a clear outline of the sorts of factors which form part of any 
judicial decision-making on the admissibility of impugned evidence. This may be instructive 
in terms of the approach which judges in the Irish criminal process may adopt to the new 
exclusionary rule, particularly in the currently opaque context of reckless or grossly negligent 
breaches of rights. 
Section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006 in New Zealand now provides that where the issue of 
improperly obtained evidence is raised the trial judge must find, on the balance of probabilities, 
whether or not the evidence was improperly obtained.29 If the judge finds that it was, s/he must 
then determine whether the exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the impropriety by 
carrying out a balancing process ‘that gives appropriate weight to the impropriety and takes 
proper account of the need for an effective and credible system of justice.’30 This resonates 
with the considerations on which Clarke J focused in his JC judgment. Of course, a notable 
difference is that the onus on the prosecution to prove the admissibility of the evidence under 
JC is to be discharged on the basis of facts proved to the higher standard of “beyond reasonable 
doubt”. 
A non-exhaustive list of factors, originating in Shaheed, which may be taken into account by a 
trial judge when making a determination on admissibility in New Zealand is provided in s 
30(3): 
(a) the importance of any right breached by the impropriety and the seriousness of the 
intrusion on it: 
(b) the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether it was deliberate, reckless, or 
done in bad faith: 
(c) the nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence: 
(d) the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged: 
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(e) whether there were any other investigatory techniques not involving any breach of 
the rights that were known to be available but were not used: 
(f) whether there are alternative remedies to exclusion of the evidence which can 
adequately provide redress to the defendant: 
(g) whether the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger to the 
Police or others: 
(h) whether there was any urgency in obtaining the improperly obtained evidence. 
When these varying factors were first pronounced in Shaheed, the Court of Appeal provided 
no guidance as to the division of weight between those factors, how they should be balanced 
against one another or if each and every factor needed to be considered in every case. 
Furthermore, each factor was in and of itself substantially vague (e.g. the concept of a “serious” 
offence was undefined and the distinctions in police culpability were unclear) and difficult to 
apply without further direction. Later courts did little to rectify this weakness in the Shaheed 
test and, in fact, in many cases decisions on admissibility were made with little if any real 
reference to the Shaheed factors considered and the judicial balancing thereof. In R v Lapham,31 
for example, evidence obtained in breach of the accused’s rights to silence32 and counsel33 was 
said to be admissible ‘on any analysis of Shaheed’34 though no such analysis was in fact carried 
out. This sort of casual approach to the application of the Shaheed test, and the use of additional 
seemingly irrelevant factors without clear justification, impeded the jurisprudential 
clarification of the test, to say nothing of its effect on admissibility decisions in individual 
cases.  
While the Shaheed list of factors was not exhaustive most of the additional factors considered 
in subsequent cases seem to have been out of place in the context of the proportionality-
balancing test. In R v Allison,35 for example, where a driver had been stopped in breach of ss 
18 and 20 NZBORA (the rights to freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary detention) 
the New Zealand High Court considered that the principal factor of relevance to the 
admissibility decision under the Shaheed test was the fact that at the time the accused was 
stopped it appeared to him and would have appeared to any “disinterested observer” that the 
                                                          
31 (2003) 20 CRNZ 286 (CA). 
32 Protected under s.23(4) NZBORA. 
33 Protected under s.23(1)(b) NZBORA. 
34 Lapham (n 31) at 291 (CA). 
35 HC Auckland, T 002481, April 9 2003, Williams J. 
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stop was being lawfully conducted. While it might have seemed that the vehicle had been 
properly stopped under the provisions of the Land Transport Act 1998, the real purpose was to 
delay the accused from returning to his residence so that listening devices could be installed 
there by the police. The fact that the encounter was carried out in such a way as to appear lawful 
to the accused or an observer ought surely not to be central to the question of admissibility 
where a deliberate breach of NZBORA rights had in fact been demonstrated; and it formed no 
part of the proportionality-balancing test as set out in Shaheed.  
In other cases judges seemed selective in their choice of Shaheed factors on which to rely. An 
oft-omitted factor, for example, was the seriousness of the offence; this was particularly true 
where the decision was to exclude the impugned evidence and the seriousness of the offence 
would weigh against such a decision under the Shaheed test.36 The failure of judges in certain 
cases to specify the reason for the non-application of certain factors where, on the facts, they 
might have appeared applicable resulted in a paucity of jurisprudential precedents on such 
issues for the guidance of future courts. Furthermore, the manner in which the Shaheed test at 
this time seemed to allow for judges to pick and choose what factors to apply in a given case 
no matter what the apparent pertinent issues gave rise to some concern. In this regard Optican 
warned that  
[...] selective and/or inadequate balancing under Shaheed risks the judicial 
institutionalisation of a slipshod approach to exclusion – a poor outcome for such a vital 
common law remedy dealing with evidence obtained by the police (or other state actors) 
in violation of the Bill of Rights.37 
The “nature of the breach” provides yet another example of the potential for subjective judicial 
interpretation within the Shaheed factors: in R v Vercoe38 the High Court considered that the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained under s 22 NZBORA had been breached in a less serious 
manner here where the accused had voluntarily attended at the police station than in the 
‘paradigm case in which police arrive on a man’s doorstep, take him into custody and 
                                                          
36 See, for example, R v Kokiri (2003) 20 CRNZ 1016 (a vehicular manslaughter case); R v Pou [2002] 3 NZLR 
637(CA) (a multi-count burglary case); R v Schutte CA 178/03, September 22 2003 (a multi-count burglary 
case); and, R v Zhu HC Auckland, T 032562, October 22 2003 (a kidnapping case). 
37 Scott Optican, ‘The New Exclusionary Rule: Interpretation and Application of R v Shaheed’ (2004) New 
Zealand Law Review 451, 463. 
38 HC, Rotorua, 6 September 2002, Baragwanath J. Consedine describes Vercoe as the ‘first decision on 
Shaheed where it can be confidently stated that the evidence in that case would not have been admitted under 
the prima facie exclusion rule’; Simon Consedine, ‘R v Shaheed: The First Twenty Months’ (2004) 10 
Canterbury Law Review 77, 78. 
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interrogate him at the police station.’ Accordingly the impugned evidence could be admitted. 
Drawing a distinction between differing types of breach of the same right, and using examples 
of hypothetically worse breaches allowed judges to effectively reduce the apparent seriousness 
of the breach in a specific case and to declare that the proportionality-balancing test from 
Shaheed favoured admission. Another judge might well have viewed matters otherwise, and, 
indeed, the lack of precision within the Shaheed factors themselves allowed for such differing 
views. 
The fact that the Shaheed test allowed for each case to be decided on its own facts meant that 
judges were slow to engage in overt detailed reasoning or to apply precedents in the application 
of the test. Writing in 2004, Optican observed that no other Shaheed judgment was cited as 
precedent for the result in almost all of approximately 60 Court of Appeal and High Court cases 
wherein Shaheed was discussed and a written decision issued.39 Accordingly, no clear approach 
to the correct and consistent application of the test became apparent in the first years of its 
existence and to a large extent individual judges were handing down individual decisions in 
individual cases. While this might be the whole point of the proportionality-balancing test, the 
absence of development of a clear jurisprudence on the proper application of the test was 
problematic and supported inconsistency. Optican and Sankoff suggested that the Shaheed test 
was operating as little more than a “judicial gut-check” on the exclusion or otherwise of 
evidence and was allowing for the personal predilections of judges to masquerade as 
principle.40 Optican further suggested that the rule as it was then operating permitted ‘[...] 
Judges of varying ideologies, sympathies and political stripes to look into its mirror and see 
exactly what they want[ed] to see.’41 While the majority of the Court of Appeal in Shaheed 
sought to introduce flexibility and discretion, this level of unprincipled decision-making cannot 
have been the desired result. Optican called for self-conscious judicial explication of the new 
exclusionary rule so as to address the confusions which it was creating in the New Zealand 
courts and he suggested that: 
if the law of exclusion under the Bill of Rights aspires to be something more than a 
repository for personal judicial preference, individual interpretive approaches, and 
                                                          
39 Optican (n 37) 457. 
40 Scott Optican and Peter Sankoff, ‘The New Exclusionary Rule: A Preliminary Assessment of R v Shaheed’ 
[2003] 1 N.Z.L.R. 1, 28. 
41 Scott Optican, ‘R v Shaheed: The Demise of the Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule’ (2003) N.Z.L.J. 103. 
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innate ideological leanings, Shaheed must be tempered by some precision in its 
methodology and some measure of discipline in its approach.42  
 
Such self-conscious judicial consideration and explication of the proportionality-balancing test 
was to follow, most notably in R v Williams,43 but the legislature first stepped in, codifying the 
rule in statute. 
In Williams the Court of Appeal made a concerted effort to offer guidance to future courts on 
the correct application of the Shaheed/s.30 proportionality-balancing test.44 Glazebrook J, 
delivering the majority judgment in Williams, declared that ‘[t]he balancing exercise must be 
carried out conscientiously so that, even if the evidence is ultimately ruled admissible, it will 
be clear that the right has been taken seriously.’45 
According to the Court of Appeal in Williams, the appropriate starting point for the application 
of the proportionality-balancing test is an examination of the seriousness of the breach which 
led to the impugned evidence. This entails a linked consideration of the nature of the right and 
the nature of the breach (i.e. the extent of the illegality; whether the police acted in breach of 
rights deliberately, recklessly or with gross negligence). Glazebrook J stated that ‘[t]he more 
fundamental the right and the more serious the breach, the less likely it is that the balancing 
test will result in the evidence being admitted.’46 On the nature of the right, Clarke J in JC 
sought to remove the pre-JC definitive distinction between constitutional and mere legal rights, 
though he observed that  
Where evidence gathering might, in the absence of appropriate authority, give rise to a 
breach of constitutional, as opposed to legal, rights, then there is a greater obligation on 
those involved in gathering the evidence in question to ensure that they have proper 
legal authority for what they are doing.  Given that greater obligation, a court might 
well more readily find fault beyond inadvertence in relation to a breach of constitutional 
                                                          
42 Optican (n 37) 535. 
43 [2007] 3 NZLR 207. 
44 While the decision in Williams was handed down a few months before s.30 actually came into force, s.30 was 
on the statute-books at the time and Optican describes the approach of the Court of Appeal in Williams as a ‘self-
conscious response to the problems associated with proportionality-balancing’ delivered at a time when ‘the 
codification of the Shaheed exclusionary rule [was] poised to take place under s.30 of the Evidence Act’: Scott 
Optican, ‘R v Williams and the Exclusionary Rule: Continuing Issues in the Application and Interpretation of 
Section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006’ (2011) New Zealand Law Review 507 - 546, 510. 
45 Williams (n 43) 239 para. 104. 
46 ibid 239 para. 106. 
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rights rather then legal rights, for the greater the obligation of care, the easier it will be 
to determine that an absence of care was more severe.47 
Under the New Zealand test, a court should next consider any aggravating or mitigating 
factors.48 Aggravating factors include non-compliance with a statutory code; conducting a 
search in an unreasonable manner; and, police misconduct.49 Police misconduct in this context 
encompasses both “bad faith” and unknowing illegality or mistaken improper motives and, 
according to the Court it could also include a deliberate, reckless or grossly careless decision 
not to use alternative investigatory techniques which were available.50 Politeness and good 
faith on the part of the police are not corresponding mitigating factors though as Glazebrook J. 
specified that such an approach is expected and its existence cannot therefore add weight to the 
admission side of the proportionality-balancing scales.51 The absence of good faith may, 
however, add weight to the seriousness of the breach and resultantly to the exclusion side of 
the test. Mitigating factors were deemed to include, amongst others, where a search takes place 
in a situation of urgency; where the strength of the connection between the person and the 
evidence obtained is weak; and, where there has been attenuation of the link between the breach 
and the evidence.52  
Having determined the seriousness of the breach, a court should then turn to examine the other 
side of the proportionality-balancing test: the “public interest” side. The factors on this side of 
the test militate in favour of the admission of the evidence and include the seriousness of the 
offence, the nature and quality of the evidence,53 and the importance of that evidence to the 
prosecution case.54 These factors must be balanced against the “seriousness of the breach” 
factors in order to assess whether exclusion of the evidence is a proportionate response to the 
particular breach.55  
                                                          
47 JC (n 1) per Clarke J at para 6.3. 
48 Not all of the factors adverted to by the Court in Williams are expressly included within s.30(3). 
49 Williams (n 43) 242 para. 116.  
50 ibid 244 para. 127. 
51 ibid 245 para. 130. 
52 ibid 243 para 122. 
53 ‘The more cogent the evidence, the more likely it is that the accused committed the crime and the stronger the 
public interest in conviction’: ibid 247 para. 140, per Glazebrook J. 
54 ibid 246 para. 134. 
55 ibid 246 para. 134. 
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The Court in Williams was most prescriptive in its approach, prescribing for future courts the 
appropriate manner in which to apply and assess all of the factors on the “seriousness of the 
breach” side of the proportionality-balancing test: 
The assessment of the seriousness of the breach should be conducted in a systematic 
manner ... All of the factors discussed above, to the extent they are relevant, should be 
enumerated and reasons given at each stage for the conclusion reached in relation to 
each factor and the effect that that factor has on the assessment of the seriousness of the 
breach. An overall conclusion would then be drawn, taking all of the factors in 
combination, as to the seriousness of the breach in relation to the particular individual 
and the particular items of evidence involved.56 
Requiring the New Zealand courts to explicitly address the many factors involved in 
determining whether or not evidence should be admitted under s 30 shows respect for rights 
through their enunciation and consideration, allows for the development of clear precedents, 
and accordingly ensures that the law is predictable, an important aspect of the rule of law.  
Following Williams, most courts dealing with admissibility issues centring on evidence 
obtained in breach of NZBORA rights adopted a step-by-step approach to the analysis, 
employing the approach suggested by Glazebrook J. and outlining clearly the reasons for 
admissibility decisions under the proportionality-balancing test. While certain inconsistencies 
of interpretation and application could still be identified across the case-law, Optican, 
surveying 30 relevant cases, observed that  
In comparison to the confused and unsatisfactory body of case law following the Court 
of Appeal’s decision in Shaheed, the analytical schema promulgated by the Court in 
Williams – combined with the codification of the Shaheed exclusionary rule in s.30 of 
the Evidence Act 2006 – has brought much needed jurisprudential exactness to 
application of the proportionality-balancing test for the exclusion of improperly 
obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding.57  
                                                          
56 ibid 245 para. 132. 
57 Scott Optican, ‘R v Williams and the Exclusionary Rule: Continuing Issues in the Application and 
Interpretation of Section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006’ (2011) 3 New Zealand Law Review 507, 543. Notably, 
the New Zealand Supreme Court considered the operation of s 30 in R v Hamed [2011] NZSC 101, but it did not 
endorse the Williams approach. Some commentators have characterised this as a missed opportunity (see, for 
example, Chris Gallivan and Justin Wall, ‘Hamed: Section 30’ (2012) New Zealand Law Journal 116; and, 
Elisabeth MacDonald, Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Brookers, Wellington, 2012) 242) while others 
have viewed it as a curtailment on the Williams dicta which ‘reverts the exclusionary rule back to the initial, 
post-Shaheed era of judicial decision-making that led to the Williams case –that is, five years of idiosyncratic 
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The value of an overt discussion and application of the factors considered in handing down 
admissibility decisions, and the attendant development of clear precedents on this issue, is 
clear: police (including those working on the front-line and those in positions of authority) can 
be more certain of the parameters of their powers and actions; the prosecution can be more sure 
of the evidence which will be admitted by the trial court; the accused and his/her defence 
lawyers can predict with greater clarity the likelihood of any challenge to evidence being 
successful; and the judiciary can rely on an emerging body of case-law in order to make fair 
and consistent determinations on questions of admissibility. Furthermore, the extent and 
limitations of police powers on the one hand and individual rights on the other will be clarified 
for all. 
While the Irish Supreme Court explicitly left the application of the principles set out in JC to 
be considered in subsequent, appropriate cases, it would have been helpful, in order to set the 
framework for ordered and consistent development of jurisprudence in this area, if a clearer 
methodology for the operation of the presumption against admission, particularly in the context 
of reckless or grossly negligent breaches of rights, had been provided.  
 
3.1 Subsequent Case-Law 
To date, little application of the JC principles has occurred within subsequent case law. Four 
cases which have arisen in the aftermath of JC and touch on the principles set out therein will 
be discussed hereunder; however, the three which arise most directly in the sphere of criminal 
procedure do not truly engage with JC in any significant way. The first, People (DPP) v Colm 
Roche,58 relates to a claim that a member in charge who replaced another member in charge 
during the course of the detention of the accused had not satisfied himself of the lawfulness of 
the ongoing detention. In the second, People (DPP) v Marcus Kirwan,59 a warrant for re-arrest 
which was issued by the District Court was so issued to a particular Detective Superintendent, 
but was executed by a particular Sergeant not named on the warrant. The third case, DPP v 
Eamon Murphy,60 relates to the retention of DNA evidence beyond the period allowed under 
                                                          
and erratic applications of proportionality-balancing spurring the Court of Appeal's creation of the Williams 
analytical scheme’ (see Scott Optican, ‘Hamed, Williams and the Exclusionary Rule: Critiquing the Supreme 
Court's Approach to s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006’ (2012) 4 New Zealand Law Review 605, 637). 
58 [2015] IESC 67 (July 23 2015) 
59 [2015] IECA 228 (October 27 2015) 
60 [2016] IECA 287 (October 12 2016). 
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relevant legislation. The fourth case, Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy,61 provides the closest 
analysis of JC but it involves a very new departure whereby the JC principles are applied to 
forfeiture of the alleged proceeds of crime. 
 
3.2 Application of the JC rule 
In JC itself O’Donnell J, while noting the applicability of the principles set out therein to 
evidence obtained consequent on arrest and detention, preferred to deal only with the issue of 
search warrants.62 The decision of Clarke J was not quite as restrictive. Clarke J stated that the 
rule applies only where there is a question about the manner in which a relevant piece of 
evidence was gathered, as opposed to any question relating to the probative value of the 
evidence given the way in which it was obtained (e.g. in the context of a claim of an involuntary 
confession, or oppression leading to the making of a statement). In Roche, which came before 
the Supreme Court just three months after JC was decided, Clarke CJ, while not applying the 
JC rule in the instant case for a number of reasons, was of the view that the rule should apply 
in cases of this nature more generally. This case, which raised issues around the alleged failure 
of a member-in-charge who came on duty in the course of the accused’s detention to satisfy 
himself as to the lawfulness of said detention, was a without prejudice appeal against acquittal. 
The Supreme Court ultimately held that there had been no unlawfulness in the accused’s 
detention, therefore no question arose as to whether or not any evidence obtained ought to be 
admitted.  
Hardiman J, dissenting in Roche, was very strong on the requirement, under JC, for the 
prosecution to establish the admissibility of any evidence in respect of which a legitimate 
question is raised. He considered that the prosecution had not done so in this case having failed, 
for example, to introduce the custody record into evidence. Hardiman J was very conscious of 
the fact that Roche was being decided just three months after JC. He noted the tendency in the 
pre-JC era for mere legal breaches to have no consequences in terms of the admissibility of 
evidence thereby obtained. In Roche the trial judge had acquitted the accused on the basis of 
his claim that evidence had been obtained while he was in unlawful custody due to the failure 
of the second member-in-charge to explicitly satisfy himself as to the lawfulness of that 
custody. Noting that this was one of the rare cases in which the judicial discretion had been 
                                                          
61 [2018] IESC 12 (Feb 27 2018). 
62 JC (n 1) per O’Donnell J para 5. 
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exercised in favour of “an ordinary citizen” and evidence thus excluded, Hardiman J declared 
that he ‘would be more than sorry to see this exercise of discretion overruled in a case shortly 
following that of JC.’63 
 
3.3 Seeking a balance? 
In the Kirwan case, an appeal against a murder conviction, it was held that the procedure 
whereby an arrest warrant was issued by the District Court to a particular Detective 
Superintendent but in fact executed by a particular sergeant was permissible under s 194 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2006, and related provisions of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851. 
Beyond those legislative provisions it was accepted by the court that this method was generally 
adopted by An Garda Síochána: it was said to be the “practice that had existed from time 
immemorial”. In those circumstances Birmingham J in the Court of Appeal held that even if 
the legislation did not cover the practice, there was no deliberate and conscious violation of the 
accused’s constitutional rights at play. He stated that  
[i]n those circumstances the case would fall four square within the pronouncements of 
the Supreme Court in the case of DPP v JC …In this case, to use the language of JC, 
there is a high constitutional value to be attached to ensuring that all potentially relevant 
evidence, including the visual identification evidence arising from the identification 
parade conducted while Mr Kirwan was in custody following on his arrest, was 
available to the jury. In following a long established practice, at worst the gardaí could 
be said to have been inadvertent. Indeed, many would feel that to describe their actions 
as inadvertent would be harsh in the extreme. However taking the view most favourable 
to the defence and so categorising the actions of the gardaí, there is still no basis for 
excluding the evidence of what occurred at the garda station.64 
While not applying JC directly in this case, and any comments thereon accordingly being obiter 
dicta only, there is an air of balancing in the judgment. The learned Court of Appeal judge 
notes the “high constitutional value” to be attached to providing the jury with all potentially 
relevant evidence (as highlighted by Clarke J in JC), which clearly mitigates in favour of 
admission, and there is nothing on the other side of the scales to weigh in favour of exclusion, 
as not alone does the judge declare that the gardaí were at worst inadvertent, he cites the 
                                                          
63 Roche (n 58) per Hardiman J para 8. 
64 Kirwan (n 59) per Birmingham J para 24. 
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possible view that it may even be harsh on the gardaí to describe their actions in that manner. 
This was, as noted above, an appeal against a murder conviction, and the evidence gathered 
subsequent to the impugned arrest was strong identification evidence from a formal ID parade. 
Although not very clearly alluded to, the fact that such a serious offence was involved and the 
nature of the evidence was so strong may have been further factors in the balance. If the Irish 
courts conducted a more methodological, step-by-step approach to their analysis of 
exclusionary rule cases, the pattern and precedents could become clearer. The Court in Kirwan 
is not to be admonished for this though, given that, again, this was obiter dicta due to the 
finding that the procedure was covered by legislation anyway. 
Another observation which might be made in the context of this case is that the new 
exclusionary rule may discourage future policy-oriented claims being made before the courts. 
If gardaí have been operating a particular procedure from “time immemorial”, for example, it 
seems unlikely that a court will exclude evidence obtained on the basis thereof, even if it 
considers the practice inappropriate, illegal or unconstitutional. As observed by Doyle and 
Feldman, in the context of statutory provisions allowing for searches of the dwelling  
[t[here is no longer any incentive for an accused person to challenge the 
constitutionality of any statutory provisions authorising searches, since a finding of 
unconstitutionality cannot result in the exclusion of evidence in that case. This may 
significantly retard the development of constitutional law governing the authorisation 
of searches.65 
 
3.4 Distortion at the “Front End”? 
In DPP v Murphy the Court of Appeal examined a conviction for aggravated burglary and 
unlawful use of a mechanically propelled vehicle which had been based, to a significant extent, 
on a DNA sample and related record from the appellant which had been retained beyond the 
statutorily allowable time frame. It was held here that at the time the sample was taken from 
the appellant there was no intention to retain it beyond the lawful period and accordingly no 
breach of constitutional rights occurred at that time. The fact that the sample was not disposed 
of in accordance with law thereafter did not retrospectively create a breach of the appellant’s 
constitutional rights. It was observed also that an extension could have been sought on 
                                                          
65 Oran Doyle and Estelle Feldman, ‘Constitutional Law’ (2015) Annual Review of Irish Law 156-224, 222. 
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application to the courts, though this was not in fact done. The Court of Appeal held that the 
breach occasioned in this case was one of legal rights only in that the sample and related record 
were not destroyed as required by statute. Accordingly, it was within the discretion of the trial 
judge to admit the evidence and the decision to admit was not an error of principle.  
The finding that an unlawful retention of a DNA sample/record does not amount to a breach of 
constitutional rights is not indisputable. A note of caution might be sounded at this juncture, in 
the years before the move to the more flexible proportionality-balancing text in New Zealand, 
there appeared to be a tendency for courts to distort rights at the “front end” in order to avoid 
the strictness of the exclusionary rule at the “back end” of the process.66 While the Irish courts 
have now arrived at the more flexible JC rule, and there was no suggestion of such distortion 
in the context of the stricter Kenny rule,67 it is hoped that any concern around its usage or lack 
of clarity relating to its operation will not see courts attempting to side-step its application by 
avoiding direct consideration of claims that constitutional rights have been breached.  
 
3.5 Novel application of JC 
An interesting and rather unexpected application of JC came in the Supreme Court case of 
Criminal Assets Bureau v Murphy in February 2018. In fact, this is the case in which JC was 
scrutinised most closely since its pronouncement. It was held here that the principles on which 
the exclusionary rule of criminal evidence are based can be applied in the context of the 
forfeiture of the alleged proceeds of crime. 
O’Malley J, delivering the majority judgment of the Court, set out the six principles enunciated 
by Clarke J in JC. She then looked back over the pre-JC case-law and determined that in JC 
‘[a] new formulation of the test for the exclusion of evidence was established, more stringent 
than that adopted by the majority in O’Brien but not as absolute as the rule laid down in 
Kenny.’68 O’Malley J examined the various rationales which have been considered throughout 
the pre-JC case-law, and in the judgments of the individual judges in JC itself. She examined 
a substantial number of decisions in non-criminal cases where the principles behind the 
exclusionary rule were applied, such as a number of Art 40.4.1 cases and others. The learned 
                                                          
66 Scott Optican, ‘‘Front-End’/‘Back-End’ adjudication (rights versus remedies) under section 21 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990’ (2008) 2 New Zealand Law Review 409. 
67 See Yvonne Marie Daly, ‘Overruling the Protectionist Exclusionary Rule: DPP v JC’ (2015) 19(4) International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 270-280. 
68 CAB v Murphy (n 61) para 51. 
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judge also examined a number of precedents specific to the Proceeds of Crime Act. Drawing 
together the law on the exclusionary rule, O’Malley J stated that  
[h]aving regard to the range of Irish authorities… it seems clear that the exclusionary 
rule is not a free-standing rule that evolved or exists purely for the benefit of defendants 
in either criminal or civil proceedings. While it originated in the context of a criminal 
trial (O’Brien), its broader purpose is to protect important constitutional rights and 
values. It will have been seen that, at different times and dealing with different issues, 
individual judges have laid greater or lesser emphasis on particular aspects of those 
rights and values. However the common themes are the integrity of the administration 
of justice, the need to encourage agents of the State to comply with the law or deter 
them from breaking it, and the constitutional obligation to protect and vindicate the 
rights of individuals. These are all concepts of high constitutional importance. Each of 
them, or a combination thereof, has been seen as sufficient to ground a principle that is 
capable to denying to the State or its agents the benefit of a violation of rights carried 
out in the course of the exercise of a coercive legal power.69 
She went on to hold that the rights and values which the exclusionary rule, in a broad sense, 
aims to protect, are not confined to criminal trials and their effect is not confined to the 
exclusion of evidence. O’Malley J recognised that the JC rule was not an exact fit for the 
circumstances before the Court, but she held that the general approach of the Court could be 
adapted to produce an appropriate response to the claim that rights had been breached in 
accessing some cash which was alleged by CAB to be the proceeds of crime. Notably this is at 
variance with the approach adopted to proceeds of crime proceedings in England and Wales.70 
O’Malley J highlighted the constitutional values of the integrity of the administration of justice 
and the need to ensure compliance with the law by agents of the State as being of primary 
importance. Accordingly, she held that a court should refuse the order sought by the Criminal 
Assets Bureau (CAB) if the evidence established that the asset was seized in such 
circumstances that the court would be lending its process to action on the part of a State agent 
or agents involving a deliberate and conscious breach of constitutional rights, in the sense 
clarified in JC, i.e. knowing breach of rights. On further applying JC the learned judge 
                                                          
69 ibid para 121. 
70 See Serious Organised Crime Agency v Olden [2009] EWHC 610 (QB), wherein Holroyde J stated at para 44: 
‘It seems to me that there is a clear distinction between the admission of evidence in criminal proceedings 
leading to imprisonment, and the admission of evidence in civil proceedings aimed at recovering property to 
which (if the application be made out) the respondent has never had any legitimate entitlement...’ 
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suggested that a judicial discretion to refuse the application for the order would be created if 
the breach of constitutional rights was reckless or grossly negligent. She did not clarify if this 
would operate from the perspective of a presumption against admission, or was an open-ended 
discretion, though the distinction which might exist between the two (a presumption against 
admission and a general judicial discretion), in JC terms at least, remains to be clarified. 
O’Malley J emphasised that it is for CAB, in seeking the order, to establish on the balance of 
probabilities that (i) the asset was not seized in circumstances of unconstitutionality, or (ii) that, 
if it was, it is appropriate nonetheless to make the order sought.71 In all of this the judge noted, 
of course, that one has no entitlement to possession of the proceeds of crime. The case was 
remitted to the High Court for re-hearing. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The real impact of the new exclusionary rule in Ireland is yet to be seen, at least at an appellate 
level. It takes time, obviously, for disputes on the application of the law to make their way 
through the lower courts and, as noted in section 3.3 above, some of the incentive for 
challenging the manner in which evidence was obtained may have been removed by the 
decision in JC, as even a finding of unconstitutionality will not necessarily lead to exclusion 
of evidence.  
Doyle and Feldman have suggested that it is likely that ‘the values of Kenny have been so 
internalised by the legal profession, from which trial judges are drawn, that Clarke J's test will 
be applied strictly. But only time will tell.’72 They may well be correct. What might be hoped 
for, in any event, is that both trial and appellate judges, in applying the JC rule would approach 
the matter in a methodical manner, setting out the nature of the relevant right, the nature of the 
breach, the factors seen as aggravating or mitigating the situation, and the balance arrived at 
taking all relevant matters into consideration. An open, transparent approach such as this will 
allow for clear development of precedent, will show respect for rights, and will breathe life into 
the new exclusionary rule. 
                                                          
71 The approach adopted in CAB v Murphy is quite different to that adopted in the similar England and Wales case 
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